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Public Campaign Financing:                                 
The Path from Plutocracy to Pluralism 
Michael Clyburn1 
 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That it shall be 
unlawful for any national bank or any corporation organized by 
authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in 
connection with any election to any political office.2 
             — Tillman Act of 1907 
 
INTRODUCTION 
At the turn of the century, powerful corporate interests wielded heavy 
influence over government policy at the state and federal levels in large part 
through providing the majority of funding for election campaigns of those 
who would do their bidding.  In 1907, the Tillman Act3 was the first 
congressional attempt to change this dynamic.4  One hundred years later, 
the battle still rages for the loyalty of our elected officials. 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the people began a concentrated 
effort to counteract the pervasive influence of the moneyed interests on the 
campaigns, and thus, on the priorities of our elected officials at the state and 
city level.  The Maine Clean Elections Act of 19965 established the first 
statewide comprehensive public campaign financing (PCF) option in the 
nation.6  Arizona followed two years later with its own PCF program for all 
statewide and legislative offices.7  By 1997, twenty-one states had various 
limited forms of PCF.8 
Washington House Bill 1360 would create a PCF program for legislative 
and state executive offices.  This article is an analysis and critique of that 
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proposed legislation, introduced in the 2007 Washington legislative 
session.9  While that legislation is based on the successful models in Maine 
and Arizona, this article establishes criteria for evaluating the effectiveness 
of PCF programs in fulfilling the goals of increasing citizen participation 
and representative responsiveness to constituents, and reducing the 
influence of big money on the political process. 
Section I explains the basics of PCF and the constitutional framework 
under which it falls.  It also examines two successful examples of PCF 
programs from Maine and Arizona and compares them with Washington 
State’s proposed bill.  By comparing Bradley Smith’s article opposing PCF 
with an article supporting it by Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz, Section II 
establishes the criteria for evaluating an effective PCF program.  Section III 
applies those criteria to the proposed Washington bill and contains 
proposals for modifications that will make the Washington bill more 
effective in fulfilling those criteria.  Section III also presents funding 
proposals, both for the calculation of funding for candidates and for the 
funding of the program itself.  Section IV presents two additional proposals 
addressing reform in broadcast media and the propriety of the initiative 
process as the means of establishing a PCF program.  Lastly, Section V 
includes information about future plans for legislation in Washington, some 
of the strategies Washington Public Campaign plans to use to promote this 
legislation, and information on how Washington citizens can get involved in 
promoting the idea of PCF and establishing such a program in Washington. 
I. PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING: THE BASICS 
A. Constitutionality 
Any PCF program must fit within the federal constitutional parameters 
established in Buckley v. Valeo10 and Republican National Committee v. 
Federal Election Commission.11  The basic holding from Buckley is that 
government cannot limit an individual’s expenditure on her own campaign 
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nor can it limit an independent’s expenditure in support of a candidate.12  A 
limit on direct contributions by an individual to a candidate is acceptable 
because it is only a minor imposition on that individual’s freedom of 
speech.13  And, most importantly for this article, a voluntary agreement by a 
candidate to limit one’s expenditures in exchange for receiving public 
funding passes constitutional muster.14  RNC v. FEC reaffirmed the 
constitutionality of a voluntary choice between unlimited private 
fundraising and the voluntary agreement to abide by expenditure limits in 
exchange for receiving public funds.15      
B. Common Elements 
Historically, most efforts at campaign finance reform fall into two 
general categories—income and expenditures.  PCF programs involve a 
combination of the two: providing the income out of public funds in return 
for an agreement by the candidate to limit expenditures.  With the organic, 
grassroots growth of the PCF revolution, there are naturally many variations 
among state programs, but there are also several main elements that almost 
all programs have in common.  
Before turning to an evaluation of the proposed Washington legislation, 
this article will take a brief look at the successful PCF programs in Maine 
and Arizona.  It will describe the common provisions of all three programs 
and compare the parameters and limits used in each of them. 
1. Qualifying 
In order to qualify for public funds, a candidate must collect a specified 
number of qualifying donations (usually five dollars)16 from citizens within 
the represented district during the qualifying period.  A candidate is 
permitted to use a certain amount of her own money or collect a limited 
number of larger “seed” donations in order to finance the gathering of the 
qualifying donations.17  
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At the end of the qualifying period, the candidate must submit the 
required number of qualifying donations, including the name and address of 
each individual who gave a donation.18  The state conducts a verification 
process on a random selection of donors, much like the certification of an 
initiative petition.  Once the candidate is certified as eligible, she must agree 
to refrain from fundraising, accept no private donations, and limit 
expenditures to the amount provided by the PCF program.19  
2. Public Funding 
Each certified candidate is provided with a specified amount of campaign 
funds.  These amounts are specified for each different elective office for 
which PCF is available.  In some instances, the amount is expressed as a 
formula rather than a specific dollar amount.  
Most PCF programs include a matching funds provision in case a 
nonparticipating candidate significantly outspends the publicly financed 
candidate.20  In calculating the opponent’s spending totals, expenditures by 
independent organizations made on behalf of an opponent or against the 
publicly funded candidate are included.21  These methods of categorizing 
independent expenditures and of providing matching funds to a publicly 
funded candidate who is outspent by her opponent are designed to allow 
publicly funded candidates to stay competitive with privately funded 
opponents.  
3. Maximum Limits of Funds 
However, to ensure that big moneyed interests cannot bankrupt a PCF 
program, each state has established a maximum cap on the amount of 
matching funds provided to any single candidate.22  In Maine, the matching 
funds are limited to two times the original amount distributed for a primary 
or general legislative election, and for a gubernatorial primary.  The 
matching fund for the gubernatorial general election is limited to the 
amount of the original distribution.23  In Arizona, the total distribution is 
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limited to three times the original spending limit for any particular 
campaign.24  The Washington bill provides for a matching funds limit of 
five times the original spending limit for any particular campaign.25  
In addition to these caps on state contributions to individual campaigns, 
Arizona’s PCF program contains a provision that the total annual spending 
will be limited to an amount equal to five times the number of individual 
income tax forms filed during the preceding year.26  Maine and Washington 
both include a provision for reducing the amount of matching funds paid 
out if the necessary funds for full financing are not available.27  In Maine, 
the commission may also request additional funding from the legislature to 
make up any shortfall.28 
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4. Program Comparison 
 
Table 1: Public Funding amounts for each of the three state programs. 
 
Maine Arizona Washington
Population 1,321,574 6,166,318 6,395,768
Individual 
Donation $100 $100 $100
Governor $50,000 $40,000 $40,000
Senate $1,500 $3,230 $12,000
House of 
Representatives $500 $3,230 $12,000
Seed Money
Qualifying
Donation Individual Amount $5 $5 $5
Governor 3,250 4,000 4,000
Senate 150 200 200
House of 
Representatives 50 200 200
Number Required
Governor Primary $200,000 $638,220 $500,000
Governor General 










Governor Primary $600,000 $1,914,660 $3,000,000
Governor General 





S O U R C E:  H.R.B. 1360 §6, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007); ARIZ. REV.  STAT.   
ANN.  §16-945; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.21-A§1122(9). 
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5. Program Funding            
Finally, this section will compare the sources of revenue that each of 
these three states employs to fund its PCF program.  There are some sources 
that are common to all three.  The accumulated five dollar qualifying 
contributions from each candidate are deposited into the PCF fund.29  All 
fines and penalties for the violation of any campaign financing or reporting 
law are paid into the PCF fund.30  In addition, any unspent monies in a 
publicly funded candidate’s account, whether from seed contributions not 
spent in the qualifying stage,31 primary funds not spent before the primary 
election,32 or general election funds not spent during a campaign, must be 
paid back into the PCF fund.33 
It is apparent that these funding sources common to all three programs 
will provide only a percentage of the funding necessary for a successful 
PCF program.  Each state also provides additional sources of funding.  
In Maine, there is a three dollar check-off option on the state income tax 
form,34 similar to the presidential campaign funding check-off option on the 
federal income tax form.  A taxpayer may designate three dollars (six 
dollars for joint return filers) of her state income tax to go to the PCF 
fund.35  There is also a provision for voluntary donations to the fund.36  
Finally, two million dollars is transferred from Maine’s general fund (which 
comes primarily from sales tax and income tax)37 to the PCF fund each 
year.  There is also a provision for borrowing from future allocations, or, as 
mentioned above, for requesting additional funding from the legislature.38 
Arizona also has a check-off option (five dollars per filer) on its state 
income tax form.39  In addition, Arizona provides an annual dollar-for-
dollar tax credit for individual donations to the PCF fund (up to five 
hundred dollars or 20 percent of the taxes owed, whichever is higher.)40  A 
portion of Arizona’s PCF funding is provided through a 10 percent 
surcharge on all civil and criminal fines.41 
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The Washington bill makes no specific provisions for funding the PCF 
program, except the provisions, mentioned above, which all three states 
have in common.  Presumably, the program would receive funding from the 
state general fund, but the level of funding is not specified. 
II. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION 
Before analyzing a particular PCF program, it is advantageous to 
establish the desirable criteria to be fulfilled by any proposed PCF program.  
This section examines two sets of criteria proposed by experts in the field, 
and then establishes the criteria by which this article will evaluate the 
proposed Washington bill. 
A. Bradley Smith’s Criteria 
Bradley A. Smith teaches election law at Capital University Law School.  
He is one of the nation’s leading authorities on election law and campaign 
finance.42  He served for five years on the Federal Election Commission, 
including serving as chairman of the commission in 2004.43 In his article 
“Some Problems with Taxpayer-Funded Political Campaigns,” he argues 
against government-funded campaign financing and in favor of unregulated 
private donations as the preferred method of funding political campaigns.44  
He establishes the following criteria against which to judge any method of 
campaign financing: administrability, flexibility, opportunity, 
competitiveness, and communication.45  
1. Administrability 
“First, a system of campaign finance should be easy to administer.”46  
Smith maintains that a completely unregulated system of private 
contributions satisfies this criterion absolutely.47  If campaign funding were 
totally unregulated, the government would have no administrative costs, and 
the candidate would have only the cost of any self-imposed record keeping 
permitting her to contact previous supporters when reelection time rolled 
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around.48  However, Smith does concede that a well-designed PCF program 
that attracted widespread participation could lower administrative costs 
more than the current system of regulated private donations, with its 
concomitant “enforcement, auditing, and disclosure costs.”49 
2. Flexibility 
“Second, [a system of campaign finance] should be flexible—able to 
adapt quickly to changing political environments, new technologies, and 
evolving campaign techniques.”50  Based on the premise that politics is a 
“rapidly changing field”51 and that government is “notoriously slow at 
adjusting to changing realities,”52 Smith basically argues that no system, 
except a totally unregulated one, can meet this criterion.53  In addition, he 
sees any government attempt at reform as vulnerable to gridlock because 
the two major parties continually maneuver for reform measures tailored to 
give their own party a systematic advantage over the other.54 
3. Opportunity 
“Third, [a system of campaign finance] should, if not necessarily foster 
more candidacies and entries into politics by political newcomers, at least 
not overly discourage such challenges.”55  Here, Smith’s position, opposed 
to government funding of political campaigns and in favor of deregulated 
private funding, is clear in the choice of wording.  If this criterion were 
asserted as a positive—it should foster more candidacies and entries by 
newcomers—then PCF would likely be the best system for meeting it.  By 
watering down the criterion with his “not overly discourage” language, 
Smith dilutes the advantage that PCF presents in fulfilling this criterion.  
Smith’s starting premise for the discussion of this criterion is another 
indication of his general bias: “There is little reason to believe that there are 
a large number of viable candidates for office who cannot raise the 
necessary funds in a deregulated system.”56  This statement is only true if 
“viable candidates” are defined as ones who can attract the support of the 
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wealthy and the corporate interests who provide the overwhelming majority 
of the funding in an unregulated private donation system.  
4. Competitiveness 
“Fourth, [a system of campaign finance] should, if not necessarily 
promote more competitive races, at least not overly insulate incumbents 
from challenge.”57  Here, Smith again vacillates in the articulation of the 
criterion in order to negate the decided advantage that adequately-funded 
PCF programs have in creating more competitive contests.  Smith 
acknowledges that the success of PCF programs in increasing 
competitiveness depends on an adequate level of funding.  “Thus, a 
government financing system with an expenditure cap that sets the limits 
high enough may make races more competitive, while a system that sets the 
spending level too low may make races less competitive.”58 
5. Communication 
“Finally, [a system of campaign finance] should provide candidates with 
adequate funds to communicate with and educate voters.”59  Whatever 
system of financing is used, it will not be successful unless it provides 
candidates with adequate means to effectively communicate with the voters.  
Because communication depends on funding, Smith’s discussion of this 
criterion is similar to that of the previous criterion.  He argues that any 
system of financing established by incumbents sets funding limits that 
ultimately benefit incumbents.60 
6. Summary 
It is clear from Smith’s article that he believes an unregulated system of 
private campaign financing is the optimum method.  His primary argument 
centers around his belief that our elected representatives will inevitably 
design a system which promotes the incumbents’ self-interest,61 and that 
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government is too moribund and partisan to ever be able to design a system 
that can evolve as campaigns and circumstances do.62  
B. Raskin and Bonifaz’s Criteria 
“Jamin Raskin is a professor of constitutional law at American 
University’s Washington College of Law and director of its Program on 
Law and Government and its Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy 
Project.”63  John Bonifaz is the founder, original executive director, and 
current general counsel for the National Voting Rights Institute (NVRI).64  
Today NVRI is a prominent legal and public education center committed to 
preserving the right of all citizens to vote and participate in the electoral 
process on an equal and meaningful basis.65 
In their article, “The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority 
of Democratically Financed Elections,”66 Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz 
argue in favor of PCF.  They start with a similar set of criteria as Smith.  
The six criteria—three of constitutional dimension and three practical in 
nature—are as follows: (1) the extent to which all citizens are meaningfully 
able to run for office; (2) the extent to which all social groups find 
themselves fairly represented in the ranks of candidates for public office 
and are able to exercise effective influence on the political process as a 
whole; (3) the extent to which meaningful democratic debate is facilitated 
and citizens are empowered to express their points of view; (4) the extent to 
which the social costs of campaigning are kept down; (5) the extent to 
which “frivolous” candidacies are discouraged; and (6) the amount of time 
that elected officials, their staffs, and other candidates end up spending on 
raising money and reporting campaign contributions.67 
1. Meaningful Participation 
While Buckley v. Valeo68 and Republican National Committee v. Federal 
Election Commission69 equated campaign contributions with free speech, 
Raskin and Bonifaz view their first two criteria as addressing the issue of 
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equal protection:70 “The key First Amendment issue at stake in this debate 
is not the right of the wealthy to spend up to the heavens, but the right of all 
citizens, poor and wealthy alike, to speak and participate meaningfully in 
the electoral process.”71  Where Raskin and Bonifaz state these rights 
positively, Smith employs watered down criteria framed in the negative 
(e.g., not to overly discourage political newcomers,72 not to overly insulate 
incumbents from challenges73) in order to negate the strengths of PCF.  
Raskin and Bonifaz assert that the current system of campaign financing 
does discourage newcomers and insulate incumbents.74 
2. Democratic Dialogue 
In their third criterion—the system should facilitate meaningful 
democratic debate—Raskin and Bonifaz aver that the “two values 
underlying free speech: democratic dialogue and individual self-
expression”75 are more fundamental values than the “spending is the 
equivalent of speech”76 argument in Buckley.  In this respect, Raskin and 
Bonifaz agree with Judge J. Skelly Wright who said,  
Paradoxically, by equating political spending with political speech and 
according both the same constitutional protection, the Court placed the first 
amendment squarely in opposition to the democratic ideal of political 
equality.  This perverse result derives from a narrow view of freedom of 
expression, divorced from the broader ideals of our political system.77 
3. Social Costs 
Raskin and Bonifaz’s fourth criterion—the social costs of campaigning 
are kept down—is similar to Smith’s concerns about the cost of a PCF 
program.  Smith’s focus is on the likelihood that a PCF program would be 
underfunded by cost-conscious legislatures and as a result would not foster 
competitive races.78  However, in their calculation of the social costs of the 
current system, Raskin and Bonifaz include the subsidies and tax breaks 
given out to campaign backers by legislators as well as the cost of pressing 
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social issues such as affordable housing and universal healthcare, which are 
not high on the legislative priority list that is controlled by the moneyed 
interests who currently fund the campaigns.79 
4. Frivolous Candidates 
Raskin and Bonifaz’s fifth criterion of excluding frivolous candidates is 
included in Smith’s opportunity criterion.80  However, where Smith equates 
the ability to raise money with the viability of a candidate,81 Raskin and 
Bonifaz dismiss fundraising capabilities as irrelevant to the seriousness or 
frivolity of a candidacy, citing the Supreme Court in Bullock v. Carter.82  
5. Time Requirements 
Raskin and Bonifaz’s final criterion is similar to Smith’s ease of 
administration criterion.  Both agree that a well-constructed PCF program 
would be easier and less expensive to administer than the current regulated 
system of private donations.83  Where Smith expresses skepticism that such 
a system can be constructed or passed by Congress,84 Raskin and Bonifaz 
consider how much time currently spent fundraising could be used by 
incumbents to perform their elected duties and by challengers and 
incumbents alike to actually talk to citizens and debate the issues.85 
6. Summary 
While Smith firmly agrees with the holding in Buckley that campaign 
contributions are free speech and believes that the best system of campaign 
financing should not limit that speech, Raskin and Bonifaz argue that 
political equality—the right to participate in the political process as a voter 
and candidate—is a more fundamental value and a more suitable goal for 
campaign financing systems to aspire to.  Smith and Raskin and Bonifaz 
agree that a system should provide adequate funding for legitimate 
candidates and prevent frivolous ones, but they disagree on how to define 
these terms. 
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C. This Article’s Criteria 
Having looked at the criteria articulated in these two articles, one 
sympathetic to PCF and the other opposed, this article establishes its own 
criteria with which to analyze the PCF bill introduced in the 2007 
Washington State Legislative Session.  Ease of administration is a desirable 
criterion for any government program: local, state, or federal, regardless of 
its goals or subject matter.  Smith and Raskin and Bonifaz included ease of 
administration in their criteria.  However, I believe that the guiding 
principle is to design the simplest program that is effective in achieving the 
goals.  In other words, effectiveness should be valued more than ease of 
administration.  Therefore, ease of administration is not one of the specific 
criteria used to evaluate Washington’s proposed PCF program. 
The overall goal of any legislation pertaining to campaigns or elections is 
to encourage citizen participation and to strengthen a government of the 
people, for the people, and by the people.  With that ultimate goal in mind, 
this article proposes the following criteria for evaluating a PCF program. 
1. Access 
An effective PCF program creates an environment where citizens with 
innovative ideas or community support can mount an effective campaign 
for an elective office.  The challenge is to strike a balance between creating 
a robust and varied primary campaign season and limiting the costs to the 
program, thereby encouraging new ideas and candidates while discouraging 
the waste of public funds. 
2. Focus 
An effective PCF program creates political campaigns that include 
significant candidate/voter interaction and that focus on issues and 
solutions.  Any PCF program will make this possible by freeing up the time 
and energy a candidate must devote to fundraising under the current system.  
An effective program will actively foster these types of campaign activities. 
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3. Funding 
To be effective, a PCF program must provide a level of funding that 
allows a publicly funded candidate to mount a competitive campaign.  An 
ideal PCF program will be funded in a manner that does not create an added 
financial burden on lower- and middle- income citizens.  This principle is 
derived from the fact that, under the current campaign financing system, the 
working people cannot afford an adequate “voice” in the process.  Indeed, 
this is one of the primary complaints about the current system: “[l]ess than 
one percent of the nation’s population contributed seventy-seven percent of 
all campaign funds raised in the 1992 election cycle.”86  Philosophically, 
the tax burden of funding campaigns cannot fall on those who cannot afford 
to participate fully under the current system. 
4. Adaptability 
In order to stay relevant and effective over time, a PCF program must 
have a monitoring and review system to evaluate the changing realities of 
campaigns.  The level of funding provided to qualified candidates, the 
amount of funding required for the overall program as participation 
increases, and the qualifying requirements for candidates will all require 
adjustment over time, and an effective PCF program will have a built-in 
mechanism to provide these adjustments.  In addition, the breadth of human 
ingenuity will invariably find loopholes and bypasses in the most carefully 
and comprehensively crafted legislation.  A periodic review of the funding 
levels and qualifying requirements would thus be necessary for the 
continued effectiveness of a PCF program. 
5. Summary 
The criteria set out above are totally compatible with those established by 
Raskin and Bonifaz.  The primary addition is the philosophical principle 
that the tax burden of funding a PCF system should not fall on those who 
cannot afford to participate in the current system.  Also added is the 
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adaptability criterion that incorporates the flexibility principle of Smith.  
However, where Smith expresses great doubt that any government-
regulated system can exhibit that flexibility, this article proposes methods of 
achieving that flexibility that can be incorporated into a PCF system.  
Smith’s criteria of opportunity, competitiveness, and communication are 
also incorporated into these criteria, but are more definitively stated here as 
desirable qualities than the equivocal definitions given by Smith.  As noted 
above, the criterion of ease of administration is accepted as a desirable goal 
by this article’s criteria, but it is subordinate to the goal of an effective 
system.  
III. PROPOSALS FOR WASHINGTON STATE PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING 
This section analyzes the PCF program in Washington House Bill 1360 
under the criteria established in this article and proposes changes to make it 
more effective.  
A. Statement of Purpose 
Deborah E. Schneider (J.D. 1999 Washington University), in her note 
“As Goes Main? [sic]  The 1996 Main [sic] Clean Election Act,” analyzes 
several court cases that were brought as challenges to Maine’s public 
campaign finance program.87  After this analysis she advises that states 
which are considering similar reforms “should consider the implications of 
the legal challenges to the MCEA (Maine Clean Elections Act) and draft 
their reforms accordingly.”88  Because the prevailing standard of analysis is 
one of whether the program is narrowly tailored to further the state’s 
compelling interest,89 her primary recommendation is that any reform 
legislation include an explicit and extensive set of “Findings and 
Declarations”90 which articulates the problems the legislation is aimed at 
solving, the principles it is designed to enhance, and the compelling state 
interests it is furthering.91  
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The proposed Washington House Bill 1360 contains only two sentences 
of purpose:  
 The purpose of this act is to create a system of clean elections 
for state office campaigns through public financing, thereby 
focusing campaigns on issues and away from the sources of 
campaign contributions. Public financing of campaigns will limit 
the influence of large contributors and special interests in political 
campaigns.92  
While these statements contain the essence of the purpose and may be 
enough to convince the already converted, a much stronger statement must 
be made to assure that any court analysis can determine the fundamental 
state interests being served and the narrow tailoring of the program to serve 
those interests.  The “Declaration of Policy” that accompanied 
Washington’s Public Disclosure Act93 provides a good example.94  It is 
much more explicit and detailed in describing the problems addressed and 
the reasons for the solutions offered.  
Here, then, is a proposed statement of findings and declarations based on 
Schneider’s recommendations, Washington’s Public Disclosure Act, and the 
model bill on the website of Public Campaign:95 
The free and sovereign people of the state of Washington, in order to 
promote greater participation by more of its citizenry in the political process 
of electing representatives, do hereby establish this public campaign finance 
program (PCF).  It is in the best interest of the state and of its people to 
have a wide variety of candidates running for office and to have its political 
campaigns focused on communication to and interaction with the voters on 
the pressing issues of the day.  With the ever increasing cost of political 
campaigns, candidates find that they must spend more of their time 
fundraising and less time talking to the voters.  
Article 1, §19 of the Washington State Constitution states that “[a]ll 
elections shall be free and equal.”96  We institute this PCF program in order 
to further promote the equal opportunity of all citizens to run for office in 
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the state of Washington.  The current system of campaign financing 
undermines this equality of opportunity.  Currently in Washington, a large 
majority of campaign funding comes from a small minority of wealthy 
donors, who thus determine which candidates will be presented to the 
voters.  When representatives supported by this wealthy class of donors 
pass legislation that creates tax breaks and subsidies for those same 
interests, this undermines the public’s trust in its government and creates 
the appearance, if not the actual existence, of bribery and corruption. 
In order to promote public trust in state institutions of government and 
greater participation in campaigns for elective offices, to free candidates 
from the rigors of fundraising and encourage more focus on the issues and 
interaction with the people, and to reduce the influence of large campaign 
donors on elections and on legislative deliberations, we the people of 
Washington State implement this PCF program.97 
B. Access 
The first criterion established by this article is access: an effective PCF 
program creates an environment where citizens with innovative ideas or 
community support can build the grassroots support necessary to mount an 
effective campaign for an elective office.   
The number of qualifying contributions required in the Washington bill 
mirrors those in Arizona’s PCF program.98  With roughly equivalent 
populations, one can surmise that the resulting increase in access for 
Washington will be similar to that of Arizona.  In Arizona, a comparison of 
the first full election year after the implementation of PCF with the last full 
year before implementation shows a 24 percent increase in the number of 
candidates participating in the primary.99  Similar results in Washington 
will provide new voices and ideas to the political debate.  With more 
candidates in the primary it is likely that a more robust discussion of the 
issues will ensue. 
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C. Focus 
The second criterion is focus: an effective PCF program will create 
political campaigns that include significant candidate-voter interaction and 
focus on issues and solutions.  By freeing candidates from the time-
consuming rigor of fundraising, any PCF program will leave more time 
available for PCF-funded candidates to debate the issues and interact with 
voters.  However, to be truly effective, a program should require 
participation in certain events by candidates in order to qualify them for 
public funding.  
The proposed Washington bill mandates that a publicly funded candidate 
participate in two primary campaign debates and two public debates during 
the general election campaign period.100  The bill should go further and 
require each candidate to host at least two town-hall meetings during each 
election cycle, primary and general.  At each town-hall meeting, the 
candidate would be required to listen to citizens’ comments on issues that 
are important to them.  Each meeting would be structured to allow ample 
time for citizen comments and then time for the candidate to respond and 
articulate her thoughts on the issues raised by citizens.  
Ideally, a candidate would be actively involved in collecting the 
qualifying contributions—talking to voters and explaining why she wants to 
represent them.  As an incentive to encourage this interaction with voters, a 
candidate would be required to personally collect 25 percent of the requisite 
qualifying donations.  For a legislative seat, this means the candidate would 
have to successfully interact with fifty voters in her district.  For a candidate 
for governor, perhaps a more realistic requirement would be 10 percent, or 
four hundred voters.      
Arguably, a hate group, a religious sect, or some other special interest 
group could collect enough qualifying signatures and donations to put forth 
a candidate to run on public money.  Evaluation and adjustment of the 
number of donations required will minimize this possibility, but not totally 
eliminate it.  A program designed to stimulate a free and robust exchange of 
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ideas must accept that eventuality.  However, the debate and town hall 
participation requirements will make apparent the ideology of those 
candidates, and the common sense and good judgment of the voting citizens 
will ensure that a fringe candidate will not move on to the general election. 
D. Funding 
The third criterion, funding, has two important aspects: the amount of 
funding provided to the candidates and the method of funding the PCF 
program.  First, an effective PCF program must provide adequate funding 
for a candidate to mount a competitive campaign.  Washington’s proposed 
bill falls short in this regard.  The second aspect is the philosophical 
principle that the burden of funding this program cannot fall on those who 
cannot afford to make meaningful contributions under the current system of 
private campaign funding. 
1. Adequate Funding 
In the 2004 election, the two major party candidates for governor spent 
over $6 million each in the combined primary and general election 
campaigns.101  Under the proposed bill, a candidate would receive $500,000 
for the primary campaign.102  If outspent by a privately funded opponent, a 
candidate is eligible to receive a maximum of five times that amount, or 
$2.5 million.103  In the general campaign, the publicly funded candidate 
would receive $750,000, and if outspent, a maximum of $3.75 million.104  
Thus, a candidate for governor would have needed the maximum amount of 
matching funds just to keep up in the 2004 governor’s race.  
The wide range of spending for legislative campaigns makes analysis of 
funding levels more complex.  For instance, in 2006, both major party 
candidates for the state senate in the Forty-eighth District raised over 
$365,000,105 while the winning candidate in the Sixth District raised over 
$500,000.106  In contrast, the two major party candidates for the state senate 
in the Thirteenth District raised only $100,000 combined.107  Campaigns for 
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seats in the state house of representatives are generally less expensive.  The 
amount of money raised by winning candidates in 2006 ranged from over 
$300,000 in the Twenty-eighth District to just over $42,000 in the Forty-
second District. 108 
Considering the wide variety of expenditures in legislative races and the 
fact that the maximum possible funding provided for a gubernatorial 
candidate under the proposed bill would barely have been enough to be 
competitive, this article recommends a provision based on past spending, 
similar to Maine’s formula for funding its legislative races.  Maine’s 
formula dictates that “the amount of revenues to be distributed is the 
average amount of campaign expenditures made by each candidate during 
all contested primary [or general] election races for the immediately 
preceding 2 primary [or general] elections, . . . for the respective offices of 
State Senate and State House of Representatives.”109  
This article proposes calculations based on the average spending level for 
each specific seat.  In other words, the funding level for a primary Senate 
race in the Forty-second District would be an average of the amounts spent 
by every candidate for that specific seat in the previous two primary 
elections.  The funding level for a gubernatorial general election would be 
the average of the amounts spent by every candidate in the last two general 
gubernatorial elections.  Of course, the matching funds provision would still 
exist to assure that each publicly funded candidate would stay competitive 
with a privately funded opponent. 
Establishing a single formula to be applied to every elective office 
covered in the PCF program serves several purposes.  First, the initial level 
of funding provided would be adequate in many instances because it would 
be tied to historical spending levels in that particular race.  The inclusion of 
low-spending minor candidates in the calculation, especially in primary 
campaigns, would serve to insure that the initial funding level would not be 
excessive.  Second, because the formula is always based on the two most 
recent races for any particular position, there would be no need for a 
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periodic inflationary adjustment or separate evaluation of the cost of 
campaigning.  By recalculating the relevant average before each election 
cycle, those adjustments would automatically be included.  
In addition, as more candidates opt for public funding, the cost of 
campaigning should gradually decline, especially when both major party 
candidates for a specific seat opt for public financing.  Given the self-
regulating nature of this formula, the limit on matching funds paid out to a 
candidate outspent by a privately financed opponent could be set at 100 
percent of the initial funding levels.  
It is conceivable that the moneyed interests who stand to lose under a 
PCF system may, at some point, mount an arms-race type of assault and 
attempt to bankrupt the PCF system by dramatically increasing the level of 
spending in specific races.  The cap on matching funds is designed to avoid 
that eventuality.  Ideally, the voting public would see the motivation behind 
such tactics and express their disapproval in the voting booth. 
2. Program Funding  
The second aspect of the funding criterion for an effective PCF program 
is the method and level of funding the program itself.  Some detractors of 
PCF have labeled it “welfare for politicians.”110  However, a clear analysis 
of the whole picture yields a different conclusion. 
Our current system is welfare for corporations.  Corporate executives and 
other wealthy individuals provide the majority of funding for political 
campaigns.  Public money is given out—in the form of subsidies, tax 
credits, and highly profitable contracts—to corporate and other moneyed 
interests (the major donors in the current campaign funding paradigm).  
This wealthy minority launders public money, and then, disguised as private 
donations, gives it back to the incumbents for their reelection campaigns.  
This article proposes that the state impose new taxes on those same 
corporate and wealthy interests to provide the funding source for a PCF 
program.  In essence, the state would launder the tax dollars to remove any 
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strings that would have been attached to donations given as private 
contributions to specific candidates under the current paradigm.  Then the 
clean money is distributed equitably to all candidates who qualify and 
choose to participate in the PCF program.  Of course, the wealthy 
individuals and moneyed interests are still free to donate directly to those 
candidates who choose not to participate in the PCF program. 
Specifically, this article proposes an excise tax on luxury purchases—all 
motor vehicle sales over $35,000, all jewelry sales over $5,000, and all real 
estate sales over $750,000.  While motor vehicles and real estate can 
certainly be considered necessities, this tax is designed to target only those 
homes and vehicles that fall into the luxury category.  This tax represents a 
substantial price increase on those items, but anyone shopping at that level 
can certainly afford to pay 5 to 10 percent more and is likely someone who 
regularly contributes to political campaigns under the current private 
financing system.  Thus, funding from the program comes from the wealthy 
class, which has historically provided a large majority of private campaign 
donations. 
Washington Public Campaigns has estimated that a comprehensive PCF 
program for the nine statewide executive offices, the state Supreme Court 
and appellate judges, and all legislative seats in the House and the Senate 
would cost approximately $22 million a year.111  This is an annualized 
figure based on the ebb and flow of Washington’s various election cycles.  
Based on the experience in Arizona and Maine, it can be expected that 
participation in the program would start slowly and grow over the course of 
the first decade.  
The luxury tax proposed here would provide the money necessary for the 
start-up phase, and the rates could be adjusted up or down as the funding 
requirements stabilize.  This article presents the philosophical grounds for 
the source of the funding, not a detailed analysis of the adequacy of the 
particular tax proposed. 
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E. Adaptability 
Adaptability is the final criterion for a successful PCF program.  The 
formula for calculating the level of funding for each seat, proposed above, 
would serve as an automatic adjustment of the amount of funding paid out 
for specific races.  The funding level for the program itself should be 
reviewed every four years to maintain adequate reserves for fully funding 
all certified PCF candidates.  
Also, the required number of five dollar contributions a candidate must 
collect to qualify for PCF should be evaluated every time the state goes 
through a redistricting process (after each national census).  The 
redistricting commission could handle that task along with its current ones, 
and thus insulate the qualifying requirements from self-serving changes 
proposed by incumbents.  In addition to adjusting the numbers to reflect 
changes in population, the number of qualifying contributions can be 
adjusted to maintain the balance between encouraging new candidates and 
avoiding the waste of public funds.  The Washington Public Disclosure 
Commission, with which Washington House Bill 1360 places all 
administrative and enforcement duties, could handle the monitoring of 
attempts to circumvent the intent of this act. 
IV. TWO ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS 
A. Public Airtime 
One further proposal would require a change at the federal level.  
Congress should direct the Federal Communications Commission to enact a 
requirement for all television and radio stations to provide free airtime to 
candidates for office and for required debates and town hall meetings. 
Raskin and Bonifaz also propose this requirement.112  Because the airwaves 
belong to the public and the users of those airwaves merely lease the right 
to use their frequencies, this requirement is in the best interest of the true 
owners of those airwaves—the public.  In support of the constitutionality of 
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this proposal, Raskin and Bonifaz cite Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC113 in 
which Justice White, writing for the unanimous court,  
redefined our conception of mass media licensees . . . [as] less like 
individual speakers and more like public meeting places . . . 
[where] the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by 
radio and their collective right to have the medium function 
consistently with the ends and purposes of the 1st Amendment.114  
The specific time donation requirements should be a balance between the 
level needed for effective communications and the level beyond which 
serious harm to the lessees’ financial well-being would occur.  This would 
not require donations of all airtime currently purchased but a minimum 
level commensurate with the jurisdictional level of the specific campaign.  
If implemented, this requirement would dramatically reduce the cost of 
campaigning at all levels and benefit publicly and privately funded 
candidates alike.  By reducing the cost of media campaigning, the amount 
of funding necessary for an effective campaign would be lower, and thus, 
ultimately reduce the cost of a PCF program. 
B. Initiative of the People 
The last proposal concerns the method of enacting a PCF program.  PCF 
programs foster wider participation in our representative democratic system 
of government and restore public trust and confidence in our elected 
officials.  It is only logical for this type of reform for the people to come 
from the people.  The programs in Maine and Arizona were implemented 
through the citizen initiative process, and this article proposes that the same 
process be used in Washington.115  
It will require a strong grassroots advocacy to institute a PCF program in 
Washington, whether through legislation or through the initiative process.  
Thus, public education and inspiration work will be necessary to create a 
groundswell of support for the initiative process.  Creating a push of 
advocacy directed at the legislature would require the same steps.  
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However, it is likely that a PCF program would ultimately be presented 
for a vote of the people even if it originated from legislation.  Over the last 
ten years, the Washington legislature has shown a marked reluctance to 
enact controversial legislation of any kind without at least an advisory vote 
of the people.  Even if the legislature passed PCF legislation, it is quite 
likely that opposition to the program would mount a referendum drive, 
which if successful would result in a vote of the people.  Ultimately, the 
initiative route provides for the vote of the people and saves the time and 
energy of pursuing the alternative methods. 
Additionally, campaign finance reform instituted by incumbents is likely 
to favor incumbents, if not in fact, then at least in the perception of the 
general public.116  Smith relies extensively on this concept in arguing 
against PCF and uses the spending limits set by Congress in 1997 as an 
example: “Every challenger spending less than the proposed limit in Senate 
campaigns had lost in each of the 1994 and 1996 elections, whereas every 
incumbent spending less than the limit had won.”117  (This comment is in 
no way intended to imply that Washington House Bill 1360 favored 
incumbents in any fashion.) 
There are also positive synergistic reasons for the initiative approach 
beyond avoiding the negatives associated with the legislative approach.  
The process of gathering signatures for an initiative would provide an 
experiential educational opportunity to display the candidate qualification 
process of the PCF program in action.  The correlation between gathering 
signatures for an initiative petition and collecting qualifying donations for a 
PCF program could be further emphasized by requesting a five dollar 
donation to the “pass Initiative #xx” campaign from each signer of the 
initiative petition.  This would further mirror the candidate qualifying 
procedure and show the whole process at work.  Thus, the process for 
qualifying the initiative would be the same as the process proposed by the 
initiative for a candidate to qualify for PCF. 
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Once the initiative qualified for the ballot, the opposition campaign 
would likely arise from those who have the most to lose if it passed—the 
large and influential donors under the current private financing system.  
This opposition would probably be funneled through an astroturf 
organization—an organization claiming to be grassroots opposition but 
actually funded and directed by the big money interests affected by the 
initiative.  However, existing disclosure requirements make it possible to 
discover the actual source of the funding. 
This is another synergistic opportunity for educating the public.  The 
more funding rallied by the opposition, the clearer the need for reform 
would become.  There is no better illustration of the way large campaign 
contributions influence politicians than a well-funded opposition to the very 
legislation attacking that system.  Under the matching funds trigger 
mechanism in the PCF program, independent expenditures for a privately 
funded opponent generates more money for a publicly funded candidate.  In 
the same fashion, massive financial support for defeating the initiative 
would provide a more clear and compelling reason for its passage.  The 
rallying cry could be, “If we prevent big money from buying this election, 
we can stop them from buying every election!” 
V. TAKE ACTION 
PCF is the reform to make all other reforms possible.  PCF allows our 
elected representatives to consider reform proposals on their merits and on 
how those proposals will affect the lives of their constituents rather than the 
wallets of big donors.  It is a reform whose time has come, and the 
examples in Arizona and Maine, plus the limited programs in several other 
states, show that PCF can be successful in creating more responsive and 
representative governments.  
However, PCF threatens the power of the entrenched controllers of 
campaigns and elections—the wealthy donors.  Control of campaigns 
equals control of public policy priorities under the current private financing 
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system.  These wealthy donors will not surrender their control willingly.  
Reform must happen the way any populist reform has happened in the 
history of this country—the people must demand it!  
Several organizations are working for PCF at the federal level and 
proposed bills were submitted in both houses last year.  Public Campaign is 
a powerful national force and serves as a clearinghouse of ideas and 
efforts.118  However, at the state and local level, more and more successful 
PCF programs are being established.  “Some form of Clean Elections has 
passed in eight states and two municipalities—Maine, Vermont, Arizona, 
Massachusetts, North Carolina, New Mexico, New Jersey, and Connecticut 
as well as Portland, Oregon and Albuquerque, New Mexico.”119 
Seattle, Washington, implemented PCF for city elective offices in 
1972.120  However, a little-noticed provision hidden in a 1992 “campaign 
finance reform” initiative prohibited any governmental entity in 
Washington from implementing a plan to use government funds to finance 
campaigns.121  This provision was repealed in the 2008 legislative 
session.122  The City of Seattle and King County are currently exploring the 
idea of PCF. 
In this state, Washington Public Campaigns is the organization 
spearheading the efforts.  Their website, www.washclean.org, discusses the 
current course of action: “In the coming months, we intend to focus on 1) 
educating the public, 2) organizing support groups in the counties and 
districts, 3) creating alliances, 4) gathering data to make the case for clean 
elections, and 5) supporting federal legislation.”123  
How does one get involved in promoting PCF?  Educate yourself and 
your friends and neighbors.  Washington Public Campaigns provides 
resources, speakers, volunteer opportunities, and promotional and 
informational materials,.124 
Encourage organizations with which you are involved to support the 
drive for PCF.  Success at implementing that reform will make the work of 
every social service, environmental, or social justice organization in the 
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state easier in the long run by creating a legislature of representatives more 
sensitive to human needs and less responsive to corporate greed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The cost of conducting a successful political campaign continues to rise 
at all levels: federal, state, and local.  Elected representatives may have to 
spend up to four hours per day just raising money for reelection.125  Public 
campaign financing offers a better way.  In Washington State it has been 
estimated that approximately four dollars per person per year would 
adequately fund a PCF program for all statewide elective offices, all 
legislative seats, and all upper level judicial races.126  The PCF programs in 
Maine and Arizona are successful examples that show how PCF can work 
to free candidates from the time consuming efforts of fundraising and the 
implied and real obligations to big donors. 
It is possible to devise a funding mechanism for a PCF program that does 
not impose any new tax burden on the working class.  The initiative process 
provides a way for ordinary citizens to implement a PCF program and to 
educate fellow citizens about the benefits of PCF at the same time.  I firmly 
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